Patronage Appointments in Mongolia
International Journal of Development Research
Patronage Appointments in Mongolia
Received 17th November, 2024; Received in revised form 09th December, 2024; Accepted 29th December, 2024; Published online 30th January, 2025
Copyright©2025, Otgonbayar Nyamaa and Undrakh Davaadorj. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
This paper examines political patronage in Mongolia. It argues that political patronage reaches the public sector. Weak control and accountability mechanisms in the civil service result in increased corruption, which impedes the country's development. One key feature of a democratic political system is public oversight. Exercising power without public oversight can lead to negative consequences. Further, we offer preliminary evidence from our study of political patronage in Mongolia to suggest that variations in patronage roles can be related to variations in the institutionalization of party systems and the nature of the links between political actors and civil servants.