Kant’s philosophy: prepositions to the state and the law

In order to understand the foundations of the current legal phenomenon, two aspects deserve special attention: the notion of State and the concept of Law. The study of these aspects is based on one of the most relevant philosophers on the subject - Immanuel Kant. This article aims to demonstrate Kant’s judgment on Law, as an instrument for the guarantee of freedoms, and this judgment is intertwined with the idea of a rational State, according to which a harmonious existence is sought. For the philosopher under study, morality is divided into imperatives, which are: the hypothetical imperative and the categorical imperative.The first imperative is nothing more than to practice a moral act for the sole purpose of obtaining an advantage or some recognition. The second, the categorical imperative, as a synthesis of morality, is when one practices a moral action, solely and exclusively, for having in his conscience, that is acting in a correct and moral way, always grounded by reason. Elsewhere, Kant differentiates between Natural Law and Civil Law. It establishes that the natural is all that right created by man him self who intends to follow ordinances, that is the individual creates laws he thinks are correct anda moral , anda is thus a free man. On the other hand, the civil law is the law created by forces outside itself, with the intention of bridging and counteracting the claims between individuals and between the State and society. It also establishes the importance of the search for a coercive civil law, since, when in a natural state, even temporary, man runs the great risk of not being able to preserve his interests. This justifies the coercive force of civil law exercised by the power of the State. The most illustrious works of the philosopher on Law and State have been researched, among which is the Metaphysics of Customs and the 'Foundation of Metaphysics of Customs', without, however, leaving aside his masterpieces ? 'Critique of pure reason'' and the 'Critique of practical reason'.